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Given the relative infrequency of tender offers in the recent past,1 the
proxy contest as a means for procuring corporate control is enjoying a
renaissance.2 Yet the proxy battle's renewed prowess reaches beyond the
limited subject of control contests. Instead, it extends to such fare as
shareholder opposition to beards of directors' recommended changes to articles
of incorporation3 as well as the impact of Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Rule 14a-8 (the shareholder proposal rule),4 thereby encompassing both
economic and social issues.5 Unlike the situation only a few years ago,6
management can no longer be assured that institutional shareholders7 will be on
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I See, e.g., MARC L STEmNBERG, SEcURmES REGuLATION: LIABILmEs AND REMEDIES
§ 11.07 (1992); George Anders, F/an-y of Takeovers hs Being Sparked by Increased
Optimism over Economy, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1992, at Cl ("Takeovers [not necessarily
tender offers] are coming back in style ... [but] hostile acquisitions are much scarcer.").
See generally Lucian Arye Bebehuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071 (1990).
2 See Meredith M. Brown, Advance Preparation by Corporate Management for the
Possibility of a Proxy Contest, 4 PRwnCE HALL L. & Bus. INSIGHTS No. 9, at 8 (1990);
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Defensive Techniques in Proxy Contests, 23 REv. SEC. &
COMMODrrmEs REG. 93 (1990).
3 See, e.g., 5 United Shareholders' Association Advocate No. 3 at 4-5 (March 1990).
4 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1992).
5 See, e.g., Marilyn B. Cane, The Revised SEC Shareholder Proxy Proposal System
Attitudes, Results and Perspectives, 11 J. CoRp. L. 57 (1985); Henry G. Manne,
Shareholders Social Proposals Viewed by an Opponent, 24 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1972);
Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate
Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97 (1988).
6 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BusINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 122 (3d ed. 1988) ("Historically, both on the election of directors and on specific
issues, shareholders have tended to vote overwhelmingly in support of the management's
recommendation.").
7 See Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A
Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 7 (1991) ("Institutional investment vehicles
generally are grouped in five categories: foundations and endowments, bank (non-pension)
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its side.8 Indeed, several instances in the recent past show that such institutions
are flexing their muscles, letting management know that their votes are not to
be taken for granted. 9 In large part, the impact of what has been coined
institutional "voice"' 0 precipitated the SEC's amendments to its proxy rules. 11
These rules, particularly in their proposal stage, generated vigorous opposition
by management groups such as the Business Roundtable. 12 Although the effect
of these rules must await further developments, there can be little doubt that the
proxy landscape is undergoing major renovation.
The contexts in which management solicits shareholder proxies are not
limited to control contests or contested proposals. Indeed, run-of-the-mill
shareholder meetings in publicly-held corporations (such as those concerning
uncontested elections of directors) involve solicitations of proxies, 13 as do such
trusts, insurance companies, investment companies, and private and public pension
funds.").
8 See Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus.
REv., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96, 103 ("It is becoming more commonplace... for public and
private pension funds to vote their shares against underperforming managements and
unreasonable antitakover charter provisions.").
9 See, e.g., Christina Duff, Stockholders Send Message to Sears Board, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 1992, at A2 (stating that "Itihe shareholder proposals appeared to have gained
widespread support from both institutional and individual investors"). See generally Anise
C. Wallace, Institutions'Proxy Power Grows, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5, 1988, at Dl.
10 See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520
(1990); Buxbaum, supra note 7; George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and
Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 881, 922; Ralph C. Ferrara & Harry
Zirlin, The Institutional Investor and Corporate Ownership, 19 SEc. REG. L.J 341 (1992).
11 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act Release
No. 31326 (Oct. 16, 1992); Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act
Release No. 29,315 [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,811 (June 17,
1991).
12 See, e.g., Business Roundtable September 18, 1991 letter and memorandum from
Clifford L. Whitehill, Chairman, Legal Advisory Committee of the Corporate Governance
Task Force of The Business Roundtable, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of
Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission's Public File No.
S7-22-91). For an example of the impact this organization has had on securities law, see
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the SEC
overstepped its authority in promulgating Rule 19c-4, a rule generally barring the listing or
trading of stock that nullified, restricted, or disparately reduced per share voting rights of
common shareholders).
13 See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Stahl v.
Gibralter Fin. Corp., 967 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing shareholders to bring direct
action under § 14(a) even when they have not relied on the alleged disclosure deficiency).
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matters as mergers 14 and other fundamental events like the sale of substantially
all assets15 and amendments to articles of incorporation.' 6 In similar fashion,
breach of fiduciary duty claims, if coupled with a disclosure deficiency, may
also invoke the proxy provisions, as when shareholders are solicited with
materially misleading disclosure to approve certain management compensation
benefits.17 The elusive subject of "qualitative" materiality also surfaces when
management solicits shareholder proxies.' 8
The provision of federal law most directly affecting the proxy process is
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act or 1934
Act)19 and the SEC rules and regulations promulgated thereunder.20 With
respect to providing shareholder relief for misrepresentation or nondisclosure,
SEC Rule 14a-921 is the pertinent regulation. Generally, under Section 14(a)
14 See, e.g., Pavlidis v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 737 F.2d 1227 (1st
Cir. 1984).
15 MODEL BUSNSS CoRe. Acr § 12.02 (1984).
16 Id. § 10.03.
17 See, e.g., Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule
10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Thomas L. Hazen,
Corporate Mismanagement and the Federal Securities Act's Antifraud Provisions: A
Famliar Path wvith Some New Detours, 20 B.C. L. REV. 819 (1979). See generally Jayne
W. Barnard, Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers: Every Business Now a Bank?, 1988
Wis. L. REv. 237; Robert A. Profusek, Nomnonetary Forms of Remuneration Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 3 (1979); Report of the Subcommittee
on Executive Compensation of the Employee Benefts Committee, Executive Compensation:
A Road Map for the Corporate Advisor, 40 Bus. LAw. 219 (1984).
18 See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Heyman, 724 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983); STEIERG, supra
note 1, § 1.01-.11.
19 Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or
consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security)
registered pursuant to section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1988). See CNW Corp. v. Japonica Partners, L.P., 776 F. Supp. 864
(D. Del. 1992) ("The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy
solicitation." (quoting J.I. Case Co.v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964))).
20 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to -102 (1992).
21 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992). Rule 14a-9 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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and Rule 14a-9, shareholders enjoy an implied private right of action for
damages. As the lower federal courts have held, negligence ordinarily suffices
for culpability purposes, 22 and through the years, a plaintiff's burden to show
reliance and causation has been greatly relaxed in the proxy context.23
In a 1991 decision having significant ramifications, the Supreme Court
examined Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9. 24 In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
Sandberg,25 the Court addressed two outstanding issues in this area:26
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the cireumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading.
22 See infra notes 59-65, 169-221 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 47-58, 222-89 and accompanying text.
24 For the pertinent language of Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9, see supra notes 19 and
21.
25 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991). Generally, the facts of Virginia Bankshares are as follows:
The curtain rises with five players on stage: First American Bankshares, Inc. (FABI), a
holding company; First American Bank of Virginia (Bank); Virginia Bankshares, Inc.
(VB1), FABI's wholly owned subsidiary; Keefe, Bruyette & Woods (KBW), an investment
banking group; and Doris I. Sandberg, among others, the disgruntled minority shareholder
who owned 2,442 shares of the Bank. Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d
1112 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 2749 (1991). VBI owned 85% while apool of 2,000
other shareholders, among them Sandberg, owned the remaining 15%. Virginia
Bankshares, I ll S. Ct. at 2755.
In December of 1986, VBI, at FABI's behest, contemplated a merger, thereby having
the effect of freezing out the minority holders. Id. FABI retained KBW to provide an
evaluation regarding the appropriate price for minority shares, id., and KBW presented this
opinion through an arrangement made by Jack Beddow, who was an officer of both FABI
and the Bank, to a group of the Bank's directors and shareholders in January of 1987.
Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1117. KBW gave its opinion that $42 per share would be a fair price
for the minority stock, basing its opinion on market quotations and information obtained
from FABI which KBW did not verify. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2755. The
Bank's board, after the board's executive committee examined KBW's opinion, approved
the merger proposal at the suggested price. Id. at 2756. The Bank hired no independent
investment advisor to determine what a fair price might be. Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1117.
In such a merger context, Virginia law required that the Bank submit the merger
proposal to a vote at a shareholders meeting, which was to be preceded by the distribution
of an information statement to the shareholders. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
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[W]hether a statement couched in conclusory or qualitative terms
purporting to explain directors' reasons for recommending certain
corporate action can be niaterially misleading within the meaning of
Rule 14a-9, and whether causation of damages compensable under §
14(a) can be shown by ... member[s] of a class of minority
shareholders whose votes are not required by law or corporate bylaw
to authorize the corporate action subject to the proxy solicitation.27
However, the Bank's directors elected to solicit proxies for the meeting, which was
scheduled for April 21, 1987. Id. In the solicitation materials, the directors stated, "The
Plan of Merger has been approved by the Board of Directors because it provides an
opportunity for the Bank's public shareholders to achieve a high value for their shares." Id.
at 2767 (Scalia, L, concurring). They stated further that "[tihe price to be paid is about
30% higher than the [last traded price immediately before announcement of the
proposal] .... Mhe $42 per share that will be paid to public holders of the common stock
represents a premium of approximately 26% over the book value .... mThe bank earned
$24,767,000 in the year ended December 31, 1986 .... ." Id. The directors characterized
the price not only as "high," but also as "fair." Id. at 2756.
Subsequently, the merger was approved with the vast majority of minority stockholders
voting in the transaction's favor. Id. Sandberg, however, did not give her approval but
instead filed suit in federal court, basing her action on § 14(a)/Rule 14a-9 and breach of
fiduciary duty as a pendent claim under state law. Id. She argued that the directors had not
believed that the offering price was either high or fair, but rather that they had made their
solicitation statements believing it the only way to keep their positions on the board. Id.
Specifically, she maintained that VBI "orchestrate the entire merger and, abetted by
an unquestioning and compliant Bank board of directors, led the minority shareholders to
believe that $42 per share was a reasonable price when in fact the stock was worth
substantially more." Sandberg, 891 F.2d at 1117. Apparently, Jack Beddow, one of the
Bank's directors also serving on FABI's board, allegedly contributed to this compliance
because of his conflicting roles. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2762. The jury agreed
with Sandberg, awarding her damages of $18 per share. Id. at 2756. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit refused to disturb the district court's judgment, holding that the
directors' statements were misleading and that causation was satisfied regardless of whether
the votes were necessary to consummate the merger. Id.
26 The Court decided during the same term three other cases implicating the federal
securities laws: Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773
(1991) (construing statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs.
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991) (construing demand on director requirement in shareholder
derivative action brought for alleged violations of federal securities law); and Gollust v.
Mendell, 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991) (interpreting standing to sue under § 16(b) of the
Exchange Act).
27 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2755.
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Justice Souter, writing for the Court, opined that statements of reason,
opinion, or belief may not be actionable without some misstatement of the facts
underpinning the reason, opinion, or belief.28 Specifically, he noted that such
statements contain two components: the opinion itself and the factual basis for
the opinion.29 Assuming that the undergirding facts are neither false nor
misleading, a statement of belief might be objectionable in one regard-"solely
as a misstatement of the psychological fact of the speaker's belief in what he
says." 30 However, to base Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 liability on mere
disbelief or undisclosed belief would be to authorize litigation founded solely
on the "'impurities' of a director's 'unclean heart.'" 31 This the Court refused to
do.3 2 Rather, to impose liability, a plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating
"something false or misleading in what the statement expressly or impliedly
declare[s] about its subject."33
Regarding the second issue, causation, 34 the Court refused to extend the
"essential link" test which it enunciated in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.35 The
Mills Court held that once "there has been a finding of materiality, a
shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the
violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if. . . he proves that the
proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation
materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction."3 6
28 Id. at 2759-60.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 2759.
31 Id. at 2760 (quoting Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (a
§ 10(b) case)).
32 Virginia Bankshares, Ill S. Ct. at 2760.
33 Id.
34 This issue, addressed in Virginia Bankshares, had remained open for twenty-one
years, since it had been reserved in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 n.7
(1970).
35 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
3 6 1d. at 385. The allegations in Mills of a materially misleading proxy statement arose
in the context of a merger between the Electric Auto-Lite Company and the Mergenthaler
Linotype Company. Id. at 377. Mergenthaler owned over 50% of Auto-Lite, having
controlled Auto-Lite for two years, while American Manufacturing Company, Inc., also a
defendant, owned about 33% of Mergenthaler, which gave American voting control of
Mergenthaler. Id. at 378. Plaintiffs alleged that Auto-Lite's proxy statement was misleading
because it told shareholders that their board of directors recommended approval of the
merger without disclosing that all of Auto-Lite's directors were nominees of Mergenthaler
and therefore under Mergenthaler's, and hence American Manufacturing's, control. Id.
The district court, on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, raised the issue of a
causal connection between the alleged violation and the plaintiffs' injury. Id. at 378-79.
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Subsequent to Mills, a number of lower courts found that the Mills
"essential link" test could be satisfied even when the votes of allegedly
deceived shareholders were unnecessary to approve the solicitation.37 The
Supreme Court rejected this purportedly expansive construction of Mills in
Virginia Bankshares, holding that under the facts presented, shareholders
whose votes were not necessary to consummate the transaction did not show
the requisite causation for Section 14(a) purposes. 38
While recognizing that the question of whether to imply a private right of
action is premised upon deciphering congressional intent,39 the Virginia
Bankshares Court was lost to find any suggestion of the scope of Section
14(a)'s private right, in the context of causation, in either the Exchange Act
itself or in that section's legislative history.40 Because the private cause of
action implied under Section 14(a) has developed without "clear indications of
congressional intent," the limits of that right are not necessarily static. The
need for malleable limits finds especial relevance when the result would be
inequitable to a plaintiff whose claim is analogous to claims previously
recognized. Hence, the joints of a recognized private right of action should be
flexible enough to permit movement when policy dictates. 41
Structuring its inquiry around the policies of its seminal decision in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,42 the Court reasoned that to recognize
causation under the plaintiff minority shareholder's theory would produce hazy
issues. Such a recognition would give rise to protracted litigation, the
Addressing this issue, the Supreme Court held that the requirement of causation was
satisfied if, upon a showing of materiality, a plaintiff proves that "the proxy solicitation
itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in
the accomplishment of the transaction." Id. at 385. Under applicable state law, a two-thirds
vote was necessary to approve the merger in Mills, and the plaintiffs' shares were necessary
and sufficient to authorize the corporate action. See Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at
2762.
37 See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y.
1966).
38 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765.
39 See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979); infra
notes 71-111 and accompanying text.
40 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2764.
41 Id.
42 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally Roy L. Brooks, Rule 10b-5 in the Balance: An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 417-19 (1980)
(arguing that Blue Coip Stamps evidenced the genesis of the Court's trend of limiting Rule
lOb-5 private damage actions).
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resolution of which would be unreliable: "Given a choice, we would reject any
theory of causation that raised such prospects, and we reject this one."43
Although Virginia Bankshares, on its face, is a proxy case, its implications
reach far beyond the Section 14(a) region of securities law. Instead, the
decision's ramifications flow into other areas of securities jurisprudence as well
as into the unevenly treated context of actions implied under federal law. This
Article first provides an overview of the Section 14(a) private right of action.
Thereafter, the Article explores the implication of rights of action generally
under federal law as well as the development of the implied right, its elements,
and scope under Section 14(a). Third, the continued vitality of the so-called
"true purpose" cases" is explored, followed by an analysis of Section 14(a)'s
culpability standards. Last, the discussion focuses on issues of causation that
Virginia Bankshares raises under Section 14(a) as well as under other
provisions of the federal securities laws, such as the survival of the
GoldberglHealey line of cases45 and the sufficiency of lost state remedies to
support claims under the federal securities laws.46
I. THE SECTION 14(A) PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The Supreme Court first recognized a private cause of action under Section
14(a) and Rule 14a-9 in J.L Case Co. v. Borak.47 The Court returned to
address this private right in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,48 opining on the
issue of causation. The Mills Court held that once "there has been a finding of
materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship
between the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if. .. he
proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the
solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction." 49 Because the minority shareholders had sufficient votes in Mills
to affect the merger's outcome, the Court concluded that causation could be
shown.50 The Court reserved, however, the issue of whether minority
shareholders could make the requisite showing when insiders control enough
shares to approve the transaction without approval of such minority
43 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765.
44 See discussion infra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
45 See discussion infra notes 233-54 and accompanying text.
46 See discussion infra notes 267-89 and accompanying text.
47 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
48 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
49 Id. at 385.
50 See iU. at 385 n.7, 386.
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shareholders.51 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed this
issue in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,52 holding that it was possible for
minority holders in such a situation to satisfy the causation requirement.53
The Court later discussed the standard for materiality in 7SC Industries,
Inc. v. Northway, Inc.54 In rejecting the lower court's formulation of
materiality, which itself was derived from Mills,55 as being too suggestive of
"mere possibility," 56 the Court formulated its standard thus: "An omitted fact
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote." 57 Under this standard,
the misrepresentation or nondisclosure need not be a determining factor in the
shareholder's decision; rather, there need be only "a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."58
Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the requisite state of mind
for Section 14(a) liability directly, most lower courts hold that a showing of
negligence will suffice to sustain liability, based at least in part on the rationale
that neither the language of Section 14(a) nor Rule 14a-9-unlike Section
10(b)-requires a showing of manipulation or deception.59 Even so, it has been
held that Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 liability must be predicated on a
showing of scienter, at least on one fact pattern. In a merger context, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the level of
51 Id. at 385 n.7.
52 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
53 See discussion infra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
54 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
55 Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 361 F. Supp. 108, 112 (N.D. IMI. 1973), rev'd,
512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
56 7SC, 426 U.S. at 449.
57 Id. The 7SC standard for materiality has been recognized broadly as the materiality
standard for other areas of securities law. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988) (holding that the 7SC standard applies to § 10(b) cases); Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters.,
744 F.2d 978 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying SCto § 14(e) of the Exchange Act).
58 7SC, 426 U.S. at 449.
59 See, e.g., Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 855 F.2d 987, 995 (2d Cir. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992); Herskowitz v. Nutri/System,
Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054, and cert. denied sub
nor. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Herskowitz, 489 U.S. 1060 (1989); Shidler v. All Am. Life
& Fm. Corp., 775 F.2d 917, 927 (8th Cir. 1985). But see Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 428 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Adams v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
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culpability required for a firm of certified public accountants. 60 In adopting a
scienter standard, 61 the court reasoned that to hold otherwise would subject
accountants, whose "daily fare" was the preparation of financial statements for
inclusion in proxies, to "enormous" liability for comparatively minor
mistakes. 62 This view, however, has not been universally embraced. For
instance, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the
negligence standard applies to outside, nonmanagement directors and to
investment bankers. 63 In Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., the court asserted
that, in rendering a fairness opinion in a leveraged buyout context, an
investment banker "knows full well that [such opinion] will be used to solicit
shareholder approval, and [that the investment banker] is well paid for the
service.. . perform[ed]." 64 The Third Circuit concluded that an investment
banker should therefore be held to the same standard of liability as the
management it assists. 65
Because Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 apply broadly to "any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral," 66 these provisions may be invoked in a variety of contexts. Such
situations include, for example, proxy contests, 67 merger transactions, and
60 Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
61 Id. at 428 (citing Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1300-01 (2d
Cir. 1973)).62 Adams, 623 F.2d at 428; see Zatkin v. Primuth, 551 F. Supp. 39 (S.D. Cal. 1982)
(adopting scienter standard in § 14(a) action against accountants).
63 See Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1054, and cert. denied sub nona. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Herskowitz, 489 U.S.
1060 (1989); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).64 Heskowitz, 857 F.2d at 190.
65 Striking an interesting tone, the court opined that
[mioreover since an investment banker rendering a fairness opinion in connection with
a leveraged buyout knows full well that it will be used to solicit shareholder approval,
and is well paid for the service it performs, we see no convincing reason for not holding
it to the same standard of liability as the management it is assisting.
Id. See generally Michael J. Hetzer, Comment, Proxy Regulation Enrwing Accurate
Disclosure Through a Negligence Standard, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1423 (1982); Brian G.
Waliser, Misleadhing Proxy Statements, Case Comment, 56 NOTE DAME LAW. 579 (1981).
66 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. For the regulation's text, see supra note 21.
67 GAF Corp. v. Heyman, 724 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1983). See generally Marc I.
Steinberg, Fiduciary Dudes and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contests for
Corporate Control, 30 EMORY L.J. 169 (1981).
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more mundane matters, such as uncontested elections of directors.68
Irrespective of the factual context in which a proxy solicitation arises, to state a
Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 right of action, a plaintiff must show a disclosure
deficiency. 69 Because Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 remain the most litigated
proxy provisions,7 ° the Court's decision in Virginia Bankshares significantly
affects these provisions. As will be seen, the case also impacts upon the scope
of other federal statutes.
II. IMPLiED RIGHTS OF AcTIoN
As noted above,71 the Court first recognized a private right of action under
Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 in the 1964 Borak decision, 72 a time in which
liberal recognition of such rights was the order of the day.73 The Court based
its decision on two grounds: Section 27 of the Exchange Act74 and the "broad
remedial purposes" that Congress desired to effectuate as evidenced by Section
14(a)'s legislative history.75 Of the former ground, the Court stated in quite
conclusory fashion that "[i]t appears clear that private parties have a right
under Section 27 to bring suit for violation of Section 14(a) of the Act."76 For
the latter ground, the Court looked to the policy supporting that provision:
"While [Section 14(a)'s] language makes no specific reference to a private right
6 8 Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979); CNW Corp. v.
Japonica Partners, L.P., 874 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1989).
69 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 463 (1977); sources cited supra
note 17.
70 LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECUrrIMs REGULATION 478 (2d ed. 1988); see
Louis Loss & JoE. SELIGMAN, IV SEcuRrrins REGULATION 2052-85 (3d ed. 1990).
71 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
72 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
73 The era in which Borak was decided has been called the Court's "ebullient stage"
for the implication of private rights. Loss, supra note 70, at 926. See also Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
74 Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in part as follows:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or
other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of
all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa 1988).
75 Borak, 377 U.S. at 431.
76 Id. at 430-31.
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of action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,' which
certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
that result." 77 On a pure policy rationale, the Borak Court asserted that the
recognition of a Section 14(a) private right of action serves as a necessary
supplement to SEC enforcement proceedings. 78
This freewheeling analysis of private right implication came to an abrupt
halt upon the Court's 1975 decision in Cort v. Ash.79 There, the Court
concerned itself with whether to imply a private right of action for a
stockholder suing corporate directors under Section 610 of the Federal Election
Campaign Act.80 In denying the stockholder the cause of action, the Court
developed a four prong test for the implication of private rights:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated
to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 81
In subsequent cases, the Court has given the Cort factors uneven treatment.
For instance, the Court noted as early as 1979 in Cannon v. University of
Chicago8 2 that those factors should be subordinated to the better course of
Congress's creating an express remedy whenever it desires private litigants to
have redress for their grievances. Even so, in certain limited instances,
congressional failure to enact an express provision should not be fatal to a
private right's implication. 3 Because, in this particular "atypical situation," all
7 7 Id. at 432.
78 Id.
79 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
80 Id. at 68. Section 610, a criminal statute prohibiting certain contributions in
connection with any elections at which presidential and vice presidential electors are to be
voted for, has since been repealed. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 496 (1976).
81 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). For a somewhat similar principle to that
enunciated in Cort, see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assoc. of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
82 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (inplying a private right of action under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972).
83 Id. at 717.
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of the factors that the Court had identified as supporting an implied private
right were present, implication was warranted. 84
Surprisingly, a case handed down shortly after Cannon addressed the
implied rights issue but spoke in quite different terms. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,85 announced that
"[t]he central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either
expressly or by implication, a private cause of action." 86 This pronouncement,
at first blush, seems to conflict with the Court's assertion in Cannon that
implication is appropriate, provided that all of Cor's factors are satisfied.
Nonetheless, as a number of courts have recognized, this seeming inconsistency
is not irreconcilable. 87
The Court's decision in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewiss8
furthered the restrictive construction of implied rights. The Lewis Court
84 Id.; see Marc I. Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cwnulative Ren'ees Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 67 CORNELLL. REv. 557, 568 (1982).
85 442 U.S. 560 (1979) (refusing to imply a private right under § 17(a) of the
Exchange Act).
86 Id. at 575.
87 See Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982):
As Redington implicitly recognizes, it is one thing to create a negative inference
for implication solely because other sections of the Act contain express remedies and
quite another when the-express remedies are directed at the same type of conduct, are
intended to benefit the same identifiable class, and are passed contemporaneously with
the statute in question. As to the former, no negative inference should be drawn. To do
so would create the presumption that the implication of private rights of action are
disfavored in all circumstances. Without clear guidance from Congress, such an
interpretation would be erroneous. There can be little question that in appropriate
circumstances Congress is aware of and is supportive of future judicial implication of
private remedies. To deny a private right of action in this situation would not only
undermine Congress' intent but would also inflict needless injustices upon aggrieved
parties. As to the latter, however, a negative inference can properly be drawn. In this
instance, Congress expressly focused on the conduct in question and the class to be
afforded recompense. Before drawing such an inference, however, courts should assure
themselves that the focus of the statute providing the express remedy is directed at the
same type of conduct and is intended to benefit the same identifiable class as the statute
which the plaintiff seeks to invoke. If the answer to the foregoing is in the affirmative,
then for the courts to impliedly expand the scope of this express remedy may well
represent judicial legislation in the face of clear congressional intent.
Id. at 390 (quoting, Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law,
55 NOT DAM LAW. 33, 47-48 (1979)).
88 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
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tackled, inter alia, the issue of whether Section 20689 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 194090 provided an implied cause of action.91 Focusing its
inquiry on the statute's language, 92 the Court concluded that Congress had
provided for both judicial and administrative actions by the SEC as a means of
enforcing this provision.93 But more than that, Section 206, unlike Section
21594 for instance, did nothing more than prohibit certain conduct; it did not by
its terms provide for monetary relief.95 The Court recognized that, if any such
relief were allowed, it would not come from the statute's language itself but
rather would have to be "read into the Act." 96 Such a reading would conflict
with the "elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute
expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of
reading others into it." 97 The Court summed up thus: "In view of these express
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by Section 206, it is highly
improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an intended
private action.'" 98 It was therefore clear that no explicit congressional intent
could be found to support the implication of a private right under Section 206.
Apparently, the importance of congressional intent in this context was lost
on both the respondent and the SEC, which argued as amicus curiae. Both
contended that the Lewis Court had not completed its job until it addressed the
other factors enumerated in Cort v. Ash.99 Dismissing this contention swiftly,
89 Section 206 generally proscribes fraudulent or other deceptive acts and practices by
investment advisers. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1988).
90 15 U.S.C. § 80b-i to -21 (1988).
9 1 Lew, 444 U.S. at 13.
9 2 Id. at 15-16.
93 Id. at 20.
94 Hence, the Court concluded that "[iun the case of § 215... the statutory language
itself fairly implies a right to specific and limited relief in a federal court." Id. at 18. Section
215 provides that every contract of which the making or performance violates the Act shall
be void regarding the rights of the violator. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1988). For discussion of
Section 215 and its counterpart in the Exchange Act, § 29(b), see Samuel H. Gruenbaum &
Marc L Steinberg, Secion 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy
Awakened, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1979).
95 Lewis, 444 U.S. at 19.
96 Id.
9 7 Id. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, I., concurring
in the judgment) (citations omitted) ("[We effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in
Touche Ross v. Redington and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, converting
one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the deterninative factor, with the other
three merely indicative of its presence or absence.").
98 Lewis, 444 U.S. at20.
99Id. at 23.
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the Court tersely retorted that "It]he dispositive question remains whether
Congress intended to create any such remedy. Having answered that question
in the negative, our inquiry is at an end." 10°
Perhaps surprisingly, even after Redington and Lewis, the four prong Cort
test was seemingly embraced in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In
California v. Sierra aub,'0 for example, the Court remembered Cort's
criteria thus: "Combined, these four factors present the relevant inquiries to
pursue in answering the recurring question of implied causes of action." 1 2
Continuing, the Court reasoned, "Cases subsequent to Cort have explained that
the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action... but the four factors specified in Cort remain the 'criteria through
which this intent could be discerned.'" 10 3 A special concurrence by Justice
Rehnquist, joined by three other justices, took exception to the majority's
adherence to the Cort formulation, asserting that "the Court's opinion places
somewhat more emphasis on Cort v. Ash than is warranted in light of several
more recent 'implied right of action' decisions which limit it." 104
Hence, irrespective of such decisions as Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, the Cort test seemingly
retained vitality. I05 The Supreme Court appears to have vitiated this perception
in Virginia Bankshares.I1 6 The Virginia Bankshares majority characterized the
plaintiff Sandberg's argument regarding causation as an attempt to extend or
widen the scope of the causation ambit established in Mills.' 0 7 In order to
10Id. at 24.
101 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (refusing to imply a private right under 33 U.S.C. § 403, the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act).
102 Id. at 293. See generally Bruce A. Boyer, Note, Howard v. Pierce: Irplied Causes
of Action and the Ongoing Vitality of Cort v. Ash, 80 Nw. U. L. RPv. 722 (1985) (noting
the ebb and flow of the Court's love affhir with Crt).
103 Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293 (citations omitted). See Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (citations omitted) ("As guides to discerning [Congressional] intent,
we have relied on the four factors set out in Cot v. Ash, along with other tools of statutory
construction.").
104 Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation
omitted). See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1039 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189-91
(1988) (Scalia, I., concurring in the judgment).
105 See generally Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553
(1981); Thomas L. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a
Death Knell Nor a Moratoium--Cvil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND.
L. REV. 1333 (1980); Steinberg supra note 87.
106 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
107 Id. at 2763.
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probe Sandberg's concerns, the Court found it necessary to examine some
"fundamental principles" regarding the implication of private rights under
federal law to determine whether Sandberg's arguments for causation fell
within or without Section 14(a)'s scope.108 To explain "the rule" of implied
rights, the Court jumped temporally over several of the cases discussed above,
and landed on the spirit, if not the letter, of Justice Rehnquist's language in
Redington: "The rule that has emerged in the years since Borak and Mills came
down is that recognition of any private right of action for violating a federal
statute must ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy
. ...- 1o9 Attempting to reconcile its previous lack of precision regarding
implied rights, the Court stated that the importance of an inquiry specifically
into congressional intent did not become apparent until Cort.10 Moreover, the
importance of intent as the focus of implied rights, encompassing the pertinent
statute's language and legislative history, did not receive "primacy" among
other considerations until 1979 in Redington.'11 Hence, with respect to any
uncertainty concerning the primacy of congressional intent in this area because
of opinions subsequent to Redington, the Court's reliance in Virginia
Bankshares on Justice Rehnquist's formulation in Redington evidently resolves
this question.12
108 Id. at 2763-64.
109 Id. at 2763; see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032
(1992) ("We examine the text and history of a statute to determine whether Congress
intended to create a right of action." (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560,575-76 (1979))).
110 Virginia Bankshares, 111S. Ct. at 2763-64.
111 Id. at 2764; see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1032
(1992).112 Dissenting, Justice Kennedy also accepted the primacy of Redington and therefore
congressional intent: "I acknowledge that we should exercise caution in creating implied
private rights of action and that we must respect the primacy of congressional intent in that
inquiry." Virginia Bankshares, Ill S. Ct. at 2769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
But the settling of this issue may not satisfy another member of the Court who, after
complaining of the Court's vacillation on the issue of implied rights, noted regarding
another implied rights case:
But as the likelihood that Congress would leave the matter to implication decreases, so
does the justification for bearing the risk of distorting the constitutional process. A
legislative act so significant, and so separable from the remainder of the statute, as the
creation of a private right of action seems to me so implausibly left to implication that
the risk should not be endured .... If a change is to be made, we should get out of the
business of implied private rights of action altogether.
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I. THE "TRUE PURPOSE" CASES
Prior to Virginia Bankshares, the legitimacy and scope of the so-called
"true purpose" 113 cases were in need of clarification. Generally, these cases
stand for the proposition that management need not disclose the subjective
reasons for its actions on particular matters; rather, only disclosure of objective
aspects is required.1 14 The true purpose cases are not confined to the proxy
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(holding that an implied cause of action would not be implied from the Parental Kidnaping
Prevention Act of 1980).
Justice Scalia's disdain for the implication of private remedies reminds one of Justice
Powell's vigorous dissent in Cannon, where he asserted that the Cort four-prong test
"allows the Judicial Branch to assume policymaking authority vested by the Constitution in
the Legislative Branch." 441 U.S. 677, 743 (Powell, J., dissenting). Responding to Justice
Powell's position, the following assertion may be made which holds true to those Justices on
the present Court who have unduly restrictive views on this subject:
Although there may well exist strong policy reasons why Congress rather than the
federal judiciary should be the proper branch to authorize private actions, Justice
Powell's assertion that the courts are pursuing an unconstitutional course is premised on
unduly strict notions of judicial restraint. The extreme position taken by Justice Powell
is amplified by the observation that the twenty federal appellate decisions he cites as
unconstitutionally implying private rights of action are not products of the liberal
Warren Court era. Rather, a substantial number of judges who decided these cases
were appointed by Presidents Nixon and Ford. To argue that these strict constructionist
judges, as many of them undoubtedly may fairly be categorized, are engaging in
judicial legislation is an overstatement. In essence, Justice Powell's opinion suggests
that he may be unfamiliar with the legislative process. He wants Congress to speak
loudly and clearly whenever it seeks to effectuate a legislative objective. Although the
implementation of this practice would be desirable, it is unrealistic. Legislation is often
ambiguous, not because ambiguity is desirable, but because compromise, with the
attendant loss of clarity, is required for passage of the legislation. Such a result may be
unfortunate, but at least frequently in our system, it is the nature of the legislative
process.
Steinberg, supra note 87, at 40-41; see infra note 177.
113 See Ralph C. Ferrara, Richard M. Starr & Marc L Steinberg, Disclosure of
Infornation Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 555,
576-80 (1981).
114 See Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,619, at 97,900 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("mThe securities laws are not violated
so long as the objective facts... are disclosed."), af'd, 937 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1991);
David L. Ratner, Federal Corporation Law Before andAfter Santa Fe Industries v. Green,
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context. Instead, they may arise in ordinary Section 10(b)115 litigation as well
as in other specialized situations, such as tender offers pursuant to Section 14(e)
of the Exchange Act.' 16
The true purpose line presents what may be viewed as a safe harbor from
liability for corporate management whenever management is charged with
disclosure on the corporation's behalf." 7 Such situations may arise when
management sets forth a belief, opinion or statement relating to a corporate
matter, whether such assertion results from SEC mandated disclosure" s or, as
in Virginia Bankshares, from voluntary disclosure.' 19
The Third Circuit's decision in Biesenbach v. Guenther 120 epitomizes this
line of cases. 121 The allegations of Biesenbach chronicle an attempt by a group
of directors of Heidelberg, Inc. to assert control over the corporation. Plaintiffs
sued, alleging a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because, they
argued, the defendants had recommended certain loans as being in the
corporation's best interest when actually the loans furthered the directors'
interests in gaining further control over the corporation.' 22 The court of
appeals, agreeing with the district court, held that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim on which relief could be granted, thereby upholding the
dismissal' 23 of their claims. 124 Although the plaintiffs may have stated a claim
in Ninth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation 305, 322 (Fleischer, Lipton & Vandegrift
eds. 1978) ("It is not necessary to say, 'this is a grossly unfair transaction in which the
board of directors is overreaching the minority shareholders.' You just have to give them
the facts.").
115 See, e.g., Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978).
116 See, e.g., Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980).
117 See, e.g., Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 791 (5th Cir. 1988)
("Case law clearly holds that a defendant's motive is not a material 'fact.'").
118 See, e.g., item 8 of schedule 13E-3, 17 C.F.R. § 13e-100 (1991); requiring the
disclosure of whether the issuer in a going private transaction reasonably believes that the
transaction is fair or unfair to unaffilated security holders.
119 See Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2767 (Scalia, I.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1038-39 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Thompson
v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); supra
notes 97, 104.
120 588 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1978).
121 Other examples include Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp.
1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Prod., Inc., 597 F.2d 635 (8th Cir.
1979); Morrissey v. County Tower Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1115 (E.D. Mo. 1983), aft'd, 717
F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1983).
122 Biesenbach, 588 F.2d at 400.
123 See FED. R. CIw. P. 12(b)(6), providing for the dismissal of suits for failure to state
a claim on which relief can be granted.
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under state law for breach of fiduciary duty, the Supreme Court's decision in
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green'25 made clear that, absent deception or
manipulation, breach of fiduciary duty violates neither Section 10(b) nor Rule
10b-5.12 6
The Biesenbach plaintiffs had alleged, moreover, that "[a]t all times the
individual defendants told shareholders that the... transactions were in the
best interests of the shareholders and were designed to protect shareholders'
financial interests," when in fact those representations were false.127 To accept
such an argument, the Third Circuit reasoned, would be to delve into the
subjective "impurities" of a director's "unclean heart," 128 a situation that Santa
Fe would not tolerate and that the Court could not accept. 129
Similarly, in Bertoglio v. Texas International Company,13a the
corporation's board solicited shareholder approval of a lucrative stock
appreciation rights plan that would benefit five of the directors. 131 Although it
12 4 Biesenbach, 588 F.2d at 401.
125 430 U.S. 462 (1977). Santa Fe arose in the context of a Delaware short-form
merger, in which a parent company owning at least 90% of a subsidiary could merge with
that subsidiary upon approval of the parent's board of directors. Id. at 465. Minority
shareholders would receive cash for their shares but by the statute's terms were entitled to
neither advance notice of the merger nor even to give their consent for the transaction. Id.
Although appraisal rights existed, the plaintiffs elected not to pursue them, instead filing suit
based on Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 and arguing that the board had obtained a fraudulent
appraisal of the subsidiary's stock. Id. at 467. The Court, noting that all provisions of the
short-form merger statute had been satisfied, id. at 466, held that only conduct involving
manipulation or deception could state a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5. Id. at
472-73. Although the plaintiffs might have had an action in state court for breach of
fiduciary duty, federal law would not embrace their claims because of the congressional
intent evidenced in Section 10(b) requiring manipulation or deception. Id. at 473.
126 Biesenbach, 588 F.2d at 402.
127 Id. at 401-02.
128 Id. at 402.
129 Id. Similarly, the court in Lessner v. Casey, 681 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Mich. 1988),
held that plaintiff's assertion that defendants had not disclosed that the offering price for a
corporation's common stock was determined without regard to the price's fairness to
plaintiffs and other members of the class and therefore violated Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5, would not support the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment because of Santa Fe. See
also Billard v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 683 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that the issue of
an offering price's fairness, without more, will not support a Section 10(b) action); Nutis v.
Penn Merchandising Corp., 610 F. Supp. 1573 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that fiduciaries'
failure to disclose that the merger's price was grossly unfair would not state a claim under
Section 10(b)).
130 488 F. Supp. 630 (D. Del. 1980).
131 Id. at 648-50.
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had been held that, under certain circumstances, director profits under such
plans were payable to the corporation under Section 16(b) of the Exchange
Act, 132 an SEC rule promulgated thereunder contained a safe harbor provision
under which the directors could keep their profits; the existence of the safe
harbor, and therefore the fact that the directors could retain these benefits, was
undisclosed. 133 Although plaintiffs alleged that this nondisclosure was
actionable under Section 14(a), the court disagreed, asserting that "[s]ection
14(a) of the Act and Rule 14a-9 . . . do not require what amounts to a
confession that certain information, otherwise immaterial to the issue before the
shareholders, has been omitted." 134 The court reasoned that the nondisclosure
did not go to the purpose for which the proxies were solicited, and
management was therefore not required to disclose its motivation, "for to hold
otherwise would expand the concept of materiality to unworkable
proportions." 135
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rodman v. Grant
Foundation3 6 declared that directors were not required to disclose the fact that
their purpose in recommending a stock repurchase program to shareholders
was to strengthen their control, which the plaintiff argued to be the "principal,
if not the sole reason for the . . . purchase program." 137 The court asked,
132 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1990) (an Exchange Act anti-insider trading provision
requiring that profits from certain insiders' short swing transactions in their own
corporation's securities be forfeited to the corporation); see also Kern County Land Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec.
Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). See generally Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient
Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FoRDHAM L. REV. 309
(1989) (arguing that Congress should repeal this "anachronistic provision" because twenty-
five years of experience with it show that it is not a rational and efficient deterrence
system); Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and Regulatory
Constrction of Section 16(b) of The Secwities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 33 (1992) (focusing on judicial and regulatory actions that unduly restrict § 16); Steve
Tbel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Conpanies,
42 HASTINGs LJ. 391, 393 (1991) (arguing that § 16 is better understood as a means for
promoting the efficient operation of publicly held corporations).
133 Bertoglio, 488 F. Supp. at 648. The SEC has provided safe harbor provisions
exempting certain transactions from liability under § 16(b). The provision mentioned in
Bertoglio exempted officer and director receipt of certain securities of their own corporation
acquired under an employee benefit plan and satisfying the requirements of SEC Rule 16b-
3. See 17 C.F.R. 240.16b-3 (1992).
134 Bertoglio, 488 F. Supp. at 650.
135 Id. at 651.
136 608 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1979).
137 Id. at70.
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"'Assuming the data are supplied, is the proxy statement nevertheless false if it
omits a confession of selfish motive[?]'"' 38 Answering that question
negatively, Judge Van Graafeiland noted that "the directors were not required
to put forth in the proxy materials an analysis of their otherwise obvious
interest in company control." 139
Nonetheless, in certain situations, a number of appellate courts seemingly
required disclosure of directors' true purpose. For instance, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual
Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Insurance Co. considered an allegation
that defendants had violated Sections 10(b) and 14(a) because "they did not
disclose to the Board or the shareholders... their real motive for adopting [a]
repurchase program, which was allegedly to retain their position of control
over [an insurance company]." 140 The court stated that the plaintiff's
complaint, understood in toto, "asserts a scheme artificially to manipulate the
market and artificially... to inflate prices." 141 Although the court approved
the summary judgment rendered against the plaintiff's claims, it noted that "[i]n
its amended complaint, [plaintiff] did not assert that the proxy statement should
have disclosed the alleged intent of the directors to inflate the price of AMFI
stock, or that this would necessarily be the result of their actions"; had the
pleadings raised these issues, though, summary judgment would have been
improper. 142 In similar fashion, the Second Circuit in the Rodman case,
although finding that sufficient disclosure had been made in that particular
instance, noted that had some "ulterior wrongful design hinging upon so-called
'entrenchment'" existed, directors might have been obliged to disclose in the
proxy materials an analysis of their interest in controlling the company. 143
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appears also to
have endorsed a limited exception to the true purpose doctrine. In Vaughn v.
Teledyne, Inc., 144 a case in which plaintiffs argued that certain directors had
engaged in a conspiracy to increase their control over the corporation, 145 the
court affirmed a summary judgment rendered in defendants' favor, but
announced a potentially far-reaching rule: "Corporate officials are under no
duty to disclose their precise motive or purpose for engaging in a particular
course of corporate action, so long as the motive is not manipulative or
138 Id. at 71 (quoting Doyle v. Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)).
13 9 Rodman, 608 F.2d at 71.
140 606 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir. 1979), ceit. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980).
141 Id. at 611.
14 2 Id. at 617.
143 608 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1979).
144 628 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1980).
145 Id. at 1217.
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deceptive and the nature and scope of any stock transactions are adequately
disclosed to those involved." 146 This language suggests, for example, that if
management's purpose is to manipulate the price of the issuer's securities or to
deceive investors in a material fashion, that motive must be disclosed. 147
Bringing itself directly into the true purpose arena, the Virginia Bankshares
Court posed the question of whether "disbelief, or undisclosed belief or
motivation, standing alone, should be a sufficient basis to sustain an action
under § 14(a)." 148 Answering this question negatively, the Court reasoned that
it would be a rare instance to find evidence of a "director's naked admission of
disbelief" uncoupled with a statement of which the subject matter was defective
because it was misleading or untruthful, and asserted that it was not narrowing
the cause of action substantially by requiring proof of such a defect. 149 In other
words, a director rarely would misrepresent his subjective intentions without
also misrepresenting the facts forming the basis for the intention; if such a
situation were to transpire, the fact that it would be unactionable would not
narrow the scope of Rule 14a-9 actions to any real, measurable degree. The
Court believed that to allow litigation based on the condition of a director's
mind and unanchored in objectiflable fact would threaten the incorrigible
litigation feared in Blue Qdjp Stamps; to hold otherwise might enable "just the
sort of strike suits and attrition by discovery that Blue Coip Stamps sought to
discourage." 150 Therefore, the Court concluded: "We . . hold disbelief or
146 Id. at 1221 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
147 It has been argued that the Ninth Circuit's language puts potential plaintiffs in a
strange position. In order for a duty to disclose subjective motive to arise, the plaintiff must
first establish a successful cause of action. However, such a quandary may still have an
impact. If a plaintiff does establish a successful cause, the disclosure of management's
subjectivity may enhance the plaintiff's recovery, especially in SEC actions seeking
injunctions in which subjective motive is probative of defendant's likelihood of engaging in
prohibited conduct again. See Marc I. Steinberg, SEC and Other Pernanent Injunctions-
Standards for Their Imposition, Mo&fication, and Dissolution, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 27
(1980).
148 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2760; see Stedman v.
Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (holding that in § 10(h) litigation,
nondisclosure of "impurities" of a director's "unclean heart" not actionable).
149 Virginia Bankshares, I1lS. Ct. at 2760.
150 Id. The Court relied on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975). With respect to strike suits, the Blue Chip Stamps Court opined:
[In the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of information even a
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial
has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at
trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or
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undisclosed motivation, standing alone, insufficient to satisfy the element of
fact that must be established under § 14(a)." 151
A question necessarily arises, then, regarding whether exceptions to the
true purpose cases, such as those set forth in Rodman and Vaughn, remain
viable after Virginia Bankshares. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the
assertion was made that Vaughn, Rodman, Alabama Farm Bureau and their
progeny "arguably stand for the proposition that when management embarks on
a particular course of conduct for the purpose of perpetuating its control,
disclosure of that design may be required." 152 However, the Virginia
Bankshares defendants' alleged motive for soliciting approval for the merger
was entrenchment-to retain their board positions in the merged combination of
VBI and the Bank. 153 While Rodman, the Second Circuit case, and Alabama
Farm Bureau, the Fifth Circuit case, involved stock repurchase programs and
not mergers, the Ninth Circuit's case of Vaughn v. Teledyne dealt with a series
of tender offers and securities acquisitions. Even so, the explicit language of
Virginia Bankshares evidences that the Supreme Court is unwilling to predicate
securities law liability on undisclosed motive, which is not grounded in false or
misleading factual representations. 154
But the duty to disclose "purpose" does not remain completely avoidable
under the federal securities laws. Such a duty arises in the context of going
private transactions under Section 13(e) of the Exchange Act, as well as SEC
Rule 13e-3 and Schedule 13E-3 promulgated thereunder.155 The term "going
private" "[r]efers to a transaction ... in a publicly-held company whereby the
controlling (or other) group substantially reduces or eliminates entirely the
number of shares held by the public... thereby causing the company to attain
private status." 156 In such a situation, items 7 and 8 of SEC Schedule 13E-3157
require disclosure of the purpose(s) for the going private transaction as well as
disclosure of whether there is a reasonable belief that the transaction is fair to
unaffiliated security holders. The Sixth Circuit's decision in Howing Co. v.
summary judgment. The very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal
business activity of the defendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.
Blue Oz'p Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740 (citations omitted).
151 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2760.
152 Ferrara et al., supra note 113, at 579.
153 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
154 Id. at 2760.
155 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1988); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3, 13e-100 (1992).
156 MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SEcuaRns LAW 249 (1989); see also A.
BORDEN, GOING PRIVATE § 1.02 (1988). For SEC definitions, see Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13e-3 (1992).
157 17 C.F.R. § 13e-100 (1992).
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Nationwide Corp. 158 augments the importance of these disclosure provisions.
Implying a private right of action for damages under Section 13(e),159 the Sixth
Circuit construed the disclosure provisions of Schedule 13E-3 relating to
fairness in a remedial fashion. 160
Although focusing on such terms as "purpose" and "fairness," the SEC's
going private rules should be viewed as being concerned principally with
disclosure of objective data rather than subjective revelation. To effectuate this
policy, adequate disclosure of such information so as to enable the shareholder
to protect himself from financial loss ordinarily should be sufficient. On the
other hand, in a freeze-out merger, stock repurchase or analogous context, the
same concerns that Justice Souter imports from Blue G*ip Stamps persist.
There often exists the actual, psychological fact of a director's motive. But to
allow pursuit of Rule lOb-5 or 14a-9 litigation on the basis of that fact's
nondisclosure would authorize a plaintiff to prolong discovery in order to
ascertain the parameters of the director's undisclosed mind and would give rise
to the prospect of "claims resting on undocumented personal assertions [that
would] resist any resolution short of settlement or trial."' 61 Such were the
concerns of Blue OCYp Stamps and Virginia Bankshares. These same concerns
counsel against the continued vitality of an exception to the true purpose cases
drawn from Rodman, Alabama Farm Bureau, Vaughn, and cases following
them.
Hence, nondisclosure of true purpose seems to be no longer actionable
even when entrenchment is the predominant motive. However, when there is a
material misstatement of reason, opinion or belief as well as the factual basis
therefor, a Section 14(a) right of action exists under the reasoning of Virginia
158 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Hewing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927
F.2d 263 (6th Cir.), remanded, 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991), a'd on remand, 972 F.2d 700 (6th
Cir. 1992).
159 Howing Co., 826 F.2d at 1475-76; accord, Fisher v. Plessey Co. Ltd., 103
F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). But see Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 595 F.
Supp. 1385 (D. Del. 1984) (no private damages remedy under Section 13(e)), aff'd on other
grounds, 769 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1985). See also Mary C. Burson, Note, Securities Law: An
Argument for Recognition of an Implied Private Cause of Action for Shareholders Under
Section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the Context of Going Private, 64
NaR DAME L. REV. 606 (1989).
160 Hewing Co., 826 F.2d at 1478-79; see Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927
F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991), on remand, 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992); Ndiva Kofele-Kale,
The SEC's Going-Private Rules-Antaysis and Developments, 19 SEc. REG. LJ. 139, 141
(1991).
161 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2758 (1991). The Court
relied on Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (holding that
plaintiff must be purchaser or seller of securities to have standing under § 10(b)).
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Bankshares.162 Moreover, even though subjective intentions need not be
revealed, objective disclosure nonetheless may be required by securities law
mandates focusing on a proposed transaction's efa. 163
Although the Virginia Bankshares Court observed that naked disbelief or
undisclosed motive at first glance may seem significant, 164 neither can fulfill
Rule 14a-9's or Rule lOb-5's requirement that the misstatement or omission
must be of a material fact.165 A director's reason, opinion or belief is just as it
implies; only the facts forming the basis for such reason, opinion or belief can
be deemed to satisfy the Rule's materiality requirement. In so holding, the
Court feared that wasteful litigation would ensue were it to allow suits
premised on mere conjecture that a director's motive was incongruous with the
statements set forth in a proxy solicitation. 166
No such fear exists if a proposed course of action's effect must be
disclosed. Whether contemplated conduct, such as a stock repurchase program,
would tend to entrench management would be more important for a shareholder
to know than a director's subjective expectation that what is recommended will
result in the fulfillment of his desire. That an intended occurrence for which
shareholder approval is sought would end in a particular result would be
capable of objective inquiry, much like the fairness of a merger price or a
solicitation's assertion that recommended action would "better" the
corporation. Such disclosure would not present an undue risk of litigation,
including in terrorem discovery, based on the feared "subjective hypothesis" of
a plaintiff that management acted for a particular purpose, a concern underlying
Blue Chip Stamps and animating the Court's decision regarding naked disbelief
in Virginia Bankshares. Disclosure of such objective facts relating to the
proposed action's effect frequently is material to a shareholder's voting or
investment decision. Recognizing this distinction, the SEC has brought a
number of enforcement actions based on a party's failure to disclose
"effect." 1 6 7
162 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2758-62.
163 See, e.g., SEC v. C&R Clothiers, Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,650 (D.D.C. 1980).
164 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2760.
16 5 Id. The standard of materiality is whether a reasonable shareholder would consider
the information important in deciding how to vote. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438 (1976).
166 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2760; see Lewis v. Chrysler Corp., 949 F.2d
644 (3d Cir. 1991); Mendell v. Greenberg, 938 F.2d 1528 (2d Cir. 1991).
167 See, e.g., In re FSC Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,886 (SEC 1981); SEC v. Grumman Corp., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
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Although the door is open for the replacement of suits based on purely
subjective undisclosed motive or belief with those based on objectively
verifiable effects, the Court nonetheless has reduced the expanse of securities
litigation by sanctioning the elimination of suits based on management's true
purpose and the entrenchment exception to that line of cases. That the Court
has done so comports with its evolving distaste for implied rights of action
generally and private actions for relief under the federal securities laws
specifically. 168 In further keeping with this trend, Virginia Bankshares raises
questions regarding the appropriate threshold for the mental state required with
respect to the imposition of liability under Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9.
IV. CULPABILITY STANDARDS UNDER SECTION 14(A)
Unlike Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, neither Section 14(a) nor Rule 14a-9
contains language suggesting that any heightened mental state like scienter is
required on which to base liability. 169 Courts, therefore, traditionally have held
that instead of scienter, a finding of negligence will support culpability.170
Although the Virginia Bankshares Court declined to address whether it would
henceforth require a mental state surpassing that of negligence for imposing
Rule 14a-9 liability, 171 the Court's language, especially understood in relation
Rep. (CCH) 98,340 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (complaint); SEC v. C&R Clothiers, Inc., [1980
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,650 (D.D.C. 1980).
168 See supra notes 47-112 and accompanying text.
169 Section 10(h) provides as follows: "It shall be unlawful... (b) To use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of [such rules as the SEC promulgates under this section]." 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
170 See, e.g., Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 775 F.2d 917 (8th Cir. 1985);
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976), Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D.
Ohio 1983); Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. IM. 1975). But see Adams v.
Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub non. Adams
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 449 U.S. 1067 (1980) (holding that scienter must be
shown in order to hold corporate outsiders like accountants liable under § 14(a) and Rule
14a-9). For a decision rejecting Adams, see Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054, and cert. denied sub nom. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Herskowitz, 489 U.S. 1060 (1989) (adopting negligence standard for investment
bankers).
171 The Court has declined to address directly the culpability level for § 14(a) actions
thus far. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 n.7 (1976), and regardless
of what an analyst of Virginia Bankshares may try to read into the opinion, Justice Souter
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to its paring down of that private remedy, 172 may be read to suggest that the
culpability level may no longer be simple negligence, at least in certain
instances.
Since the Court first approved a private right of action under Section 14(a)
and Rule 14a-9 in Borak,173 it has restricted the expansive view of implied
private ights to which it adhered in that 1964 case, first formulating a four-part
test to determine whether a private right should be implied, 174 and later
declaring that the determinative inquiry is whether there exists congressional
intent for the implication. 175 One might reason that if the Court has taken a
new road, as it were, in relation to implied private rights, then its feelings for
Borak would be less than warm and accepting. As reason would have it, this
assertion turns out to be true.176 The Court has on occasion noted its disdain
for the Borak opinion, at times having to state explicitly that it was not actually
questioning that case's holding, lest one be lead by the Court's tone to believe
otherwise. 177 Before his elevation to Chief Justice, Justice Rehnquist evidenced
the Court's displeasure, which hangs on the following passage like moss on
trees in the brackish coastal air:
claims that the Court still reserves the question whether scienter is necessary for § 14(a)
liability. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749,2757 n.5 (1991).
172 See generally Jeffrey j. Giguere, Note, Negligence vs. Scienter: The Proper
Standard of Liability for Violations of the Antifraud Provisions Regulating Tender Offers and
Proxy Solicitations Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1045 (1984).
173 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
174 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); discussion supra notes 79-112 and
accompanying text.
175 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).176 See generally C. Steven Bradford, The Possible Future of Private Rights of Action
for Proxy Fraud: The Parallel Between Borak and Wilko, 70 NEB. L. REV. 306 (1991)
(arguing that, although rejecting Borak's rationale while retaining its holding, the Court is
not far from overruling Borak altogether).
177 "We do not now question the actual holding of [Borak], but we decline to read the
opinion so broadly that virtually every provision of the [Slecurities Acts gives rise to an
implied private cause of action." Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 577; see also Virginia
Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 n.11 (1991). Of additional interest is
the Court's distancing itself at various times from the implied right under § 10(b) and noting
that it never has explicitly recognized that right but merely acquiesced in a long-standing
belief of the lower courts that such an action exists. See Touch Ross, 442 U.S. at 577 n.19.
But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (stating that an
implied right of action under § 10(b) "has been consistently recognized for more than 35
years" and "is simply beyond peradventure").
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To the extent our analysis in today's decision differs from that of the
Court in Borak, it suffices to say that in a series of cases since Borak we have
adhered to a stricter standard for the implication of private causes of action,
and we follow that stricter standard today. The ultimate question is one of
congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law. 178
The Court in Virginia Bankshares limited its discussion (hereinafter
referred to as the Court's "limitation language") to its interpretation of the jury
verdict that "the directors' statements of belief and opinion were made with
knowledge that the directors did not hold the beliefs or opinions expressed." 179
The Court's restricting itself to an inquiry based on knowledge may stem from
its own conviction that "such a statement by definition purports to express what
is consciously on the speaker's mind."' 8 0 Yet further in the opinion, Justice
Souter writes not that such judgments "must" or "by definition are" uttered
with knowledge of truth or falsity, but rather that "such judgments can be
uttered with knowledge of truth or falsity just like more definite
statements... -181 thereby suggesting the obvious, namely that such
judgments also can be made with some quantum of cognition less than
knowledge.182
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia deciphered the majority's rationale on
this subject in these terms: "As I understand the Court's opinion, the statement
'In the opinion of the Directors, this is a high value for the shares' would
produce liability if in fact it was not a high value and the Directors knew that.
178 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578 (citations omitted). Perhaps even saltier is another
justice's opinion of Borak:
I find this decision both unprecedented and incomprehensible as a matter of public
policy. The decision's rationale ... ignores the fact that Congress . .. already had
decided that private enforcement was unnecessary. More significant for present
purposes, however, is the fact that Borak, rather than signaling the start of a trend in
this Court, constitutes a singular and, I believe, aberrant interpretation of a federal
regulatory statute.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 735-36 (1979) (Powell, I., dissenting).
Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon still retains current relevance. See Mark D. Loftis, Note,
Inplied Rights of Pivate Action Under Federal Statutes: 7he Cont'nuing Influence ofJusl'ce
Powell's Cannon Dissent, 5 J.L. & POL. 349 (1989); supra note 111.
179 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2757 (emphasis added).
180 Id. (emphasis added).
181 Id. at 2758 (emphasis added).
182 See infra notes 183-221 and accompanying text.
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It would not produce liability if in fact it was not a high value but the Directors
honestly believed otherwise." 183 Explicit in Justice Scalia's language is the
concept that a statement of belief can be made with knowledge and with honest
belief, but implicit is the notion that such an assertion might be made with
negligent or reckless disregard as to the truth of the matter believed. Virginia
Bankshares provides a resolution for the subject directors' knowing something
is truthful and making accurate disclosure based on that knowledge, as well as
for knowing something is untruthful but making disclosure as if the putative
belief were true. But the case declines to address the situation in which such
directors, without having a knowledgeable basis therefor, make a statement of
belief in disregard of the facts as they may be reasonably gathered and subject
to analysis.
Because lower courts uniformly hold that reckless conduct in this context
constitutes scienter,184 the key issue arises when the subject directors act in a
negligent manner. Such a situation would occur, for example, when the
directors should have known that their opinion was untruthful. Such directors
could state that a particular merger price is fair, knowing that it is or knowing
that it is not. But the same statement could also be made in a situation in which
the directors neither knew nor cared whether the particular merger price was
fair. For instance, the price could be unfair, the directors opining otherwise
without a sufficient factual basis and not being convinced one way or the other.
Hence, it is clear that directors may be saddled with Section 14(a) liability
vis-a-vis a statement of reason, opinion or belief when they, with the requisite
scienter, give an opinion of which the factual basis is materially false or
misleadingly incomplete. It is also clear that Section 14(a) liability should not
be imposed where facts underlying an opinion are false but the directors, acting
in good faith and with reasonable diligence, are unaware that such facts are
false. The issue, however, is unresolved with respect to the situation in which
the opinion's facts are indeed false or misleadingly incomplete, the directors do
not know that they are false or misleadingly incomplete but their belief
183 VIrginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766 (Scalia, IL, concurring).
184 See, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (9th Cir.
1990), cet. deied, 111 S. Ct. 1621 (1991) ("Our circuit,.., along with ten other circuits,
has held that recklessness may satisfy the element of scienter in a civil action for damages
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."); G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961-
62 (5th Cir. 1981); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th
Cir. 1977). Regarding other definitions of "recklessness," see Kevin R. Johnson, Liabiliy
for Reckless Misrepresentations and Oaissions Under Section 10(b) of the Secwides
Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. Ray. 667 (1991); Marc I. Steinberg & Samuel H.
Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8 SEC. REG. L.J.
179 (1980).
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regarding the truthfulness of the facts is not reasonable. It may be argued that,
but for the Court's limitation language, the opinion can be read to suggest that
the requisite culpability level is that of knowledge.18 5
The Court's limitation language, as discussed above, 186 declines to address
the existence of a statement of belief made negligently or with reckless
disregard as to the truth of the beliefs underlying facts, a situation that
certainly can arise with some frequency. Because of the Court's analysis and
holding regarding situations in which directors know their belief to be false, as
well as the Court's continuing disdain for both the scope and the existence of
Borak, one may argue that directors' statement of belief or opinion made
negligently as to the truth of its undergirding facts would not support Section
14(a) liability regardless of the tradition that mere negligence suffices for such
liability. 187 Although it is yet too early to suggest that the culpability level for
all Section 14(a) actions is scienter-especially since the Court reserved the
issue again in Virginia Bankshares'88-that eventuality may be the next Section
14(a) case that the Court decides. It would be yet another opportunity to
confine Borak, and at least one member of the Court has made known his
stance on Section 14(a)'s private right of action: "I think the federal cause of
action at issue here was never enacted by Congress... and hence the more
narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more faithful we are to
our task." 189
Nonetheless, there are persuasive counter arguments. In construing statutes
enacted by Congress, the Supreme Court has stated that, unless the legislative
history indicates otherwise, the language of the statute controls. 190 In the
securities law context, the Court has applied this rationale on a number of
occasions. 191 The case most poignant for our purposes is Aaron v. SEC.192 In
Aaron, the Court addressed, inter alia, whether the Commission was required
to prove scienter to establish a violation of Section 17(a) of the Securities
185 See Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2758-59.
186 See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
187 See cases cited supra note 170 and accompanying text.
188 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2757 n.5.
189 Id. at 2767 (Scalia, I., concurring).
190 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 24 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 197 (1976).
191 See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); cases cited supra note 190.
192 446 U.S. 680 (1980). Regarding Aaron's impact on SEC actions seeking injunctive
relief, see Steinberg, supra note 147, at 34-41. For a Supreme Court decision construing
the parameters of Section 17(a), see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
[Vol. 54:67
1993] IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION & PROXY REGULA7ON 97
Act. 193 Applying a literal construction to the statute, the Court held that, while
Section 17(a)(1) requires scienter,19 4 neither subsection (2) nor (3) requires
such a showing. 195 With respect to Section 17(a)(2), the Court stated that its
language "is devoid of any suggestion whatsoever of a scienter
requirement." 196 Similarly, in construing Section 17(a)(3), the Court opined
that the provision's language "quite plainly focuses upon the effect of particular
conduct on members of the investing public, rather than upon the culpability of
the person responsible." 197 Like subsections (2) and (3) of Section 17(a), the
language of Section 14(a) does not support a scienter requirement. Nor does the
language of Rule 14a-9. From this analysis, it can be argued that negligence is
sufficient to impose liability under Section 14(a). 198 A number of lower courts
have so held. 199
An arguable distinction may be drawn in that Aaron was a government
enforcement action. This distinction makes sense if, by implying a Section
14(a) private right of action for damages, an express remedy is nullified or
193 Section 17(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by
the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988). The ramifications of § 17(a) are addressed by the author in
Marc I. Steinberg, Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naftalin and Redington,
68 GEO. L.J. 163 (1979).
194 Aaron, 446 U.S. at 696 ("The language of § 17(a)(1), which makes it unlawful 'to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,' plainly evinces an intent on the part of
Congress to proscribe only knowing or intentional misconduct.").
195 Id. at 696-97.
196 Id. at 696.
197 Id. at 696-97.
198 See MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURIrIEs PRACTICE: FEDERAL
AND STATE ENFORCEMENT § 5:06 (1985 & 1992 Supp.) ("Tihe Court's holding on this
issue [in Aaron] may signify that the SEC need not prove scienter in its enforcement actions
brought for provisions similarly phrased, such as Section ... 14(a) ... of the Exchange
Act.").
199 See cases cited supra note 170.
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rendered largely superfluous. 2°°  For example, in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,20 1 the Supreme Court held that scienter was required in private
actions brought for violations of Section 10(b). 202 As one of its reasons, the
Court asserted that a contrary holding "would allow causes of action covered
by §§ 11, 12(2) and 15 [of the Securities Act] to be brought instead under
§ 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural
restrictions of these express actions." 203 No such obstacle exists with respect to
the recognition of a negligence culpability standard for Section 14(a) actions.
Generally, the only express private remedy that may apply in the proxy setting
is Section 18(a) of the Exchange Act, which extends to any report or document
filed with the SEC pursuant to that Act.20 4 It is well known that, since the
enactment of the Exchange Act in 1934, there has not been one reported case
successfully invoking Section 18(a).205 As a result, the provision is rarely used
today and is viewed by many authorities as superfluous. 20 6 Moreover, unlike
Section 18(a), which has a broad scope, Section 14(a) is limited to the proxy
setting. 20 7
Another point worth noting is that no court thus far has imposed a scienter
requirement on the SEC in its enforcement actions for violations of Section
14(a) or provisions containing comparable language. 208 As the Supreme Court
indicated in Aaron, unless there are sufficient countervailing considerations, the
culpability standard underlying a particular statute should remain the same
200 See Herman v. MacLean & Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-84 (1983).
201 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2 02 Id. at 201.
203 Id. at 210. It should be pointed out that the Court's principal rationale for its
holding was premised on the language of the statute at issue, namely Section 10(b). See id.
at 197-99.
204 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988). Note that only purchasers and sellers of securities may
bring suit under § 18(a). Hence, a § 14(a) right of action coexists with one under § 18(a)
only when proxies are solicited in connection with a merger or like transaction in which a
purchase or sale is deemed to occur.
205 See Edward F. Greene, Determining the Responibilities of Underw'ters
Disuibuting Secuities Within an Integrated Disdosure System, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW. 755,
758 (1981) ("there has been no reported case sustaining liability under the section").
206 See Steinberg, supra note 84, at 559-60.
207 See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 778 (3d Cir. 1976)
("jUjnlike sections 10(b) and 18 of the [Exchange] Act, which encompass activity in
numerous and diverse areas of securities markets and corporate management, section 14(a)
is specially limited to materials used in soliciting proxies.").
208 See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 688 F. Supp. 705 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd,
890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989); SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th
Cir. 1982); SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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regardless of the plaintiff's identity.2 °9 Hence, the Aaron analysis lends support
for a uniform negligence standard under Section 14(a).
On the other hand, applying a flexible duty analysis, 2 10 the Sixth Circuit
held in Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc. that the culpability level for
outside accountants should not be mere negligence but instead should rise to the
level of scienter.211 The court was troubled by the prospect of applying a
negligence standard to an accountant who, unlike the company and its
directors, does not benefit directly from the proxy solicitation.212 The court
further asserted that, "[ujnlike the corporate issuer, the preparation of financial
statements to be appended to proxies and other reports is the daily fare of
accountants, and the accountant's potential liability for relatively minor
mistakes would be enormous under a negligence standard." 213
This view has been subject to debate. For instance, the Third Circuit held
that the negligence standard should apply to outside, nonmanagement directors.
The court's language may be read to apply such a standard regardless of the
defendant's identity or relationship to the issuer.214 More recently, the Third
209 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 689-95 (1980).
210 See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 1974) (nonexclusive factors
comprising flexible duty analysis include "the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff,
the defendant's access to the information as compared to the plaintiff's access, the benefit
that the defendant derives from the relationship, the defendant's awareness of whether the
plaintiff was relying upon their relationship in making his investment decisions and the
defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in question."). Note that, although
the Ninth Circuit subsequently rejected the flexible duty test for defining "reckless" conduct
for purposes of Section 10(b) in Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70
(9th Cir. 1990), the standard nonetheless may retain vitality in other contexts.
211 Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Adams v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 449 U.S. 1067 (1980).
2 12 Id. at 428.
213 Id. at 429. The Adams court also stated that the legislative history of Section 14(a)
indicated that the provision was intended to proscribe only intentional misconduct. As
support, the court quoted the following passage from the Exchange Act's legislative history:
It is contemplated that the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
will protect investors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies, on the one hand,
by irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away from honest
and conscientious corporation officials; and, on the other hand, by unscrupulous
corporate officials seeking to regain control of the management by concealing and
distorting facts.
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Seass. 77
(1934) (emphasis added by court).
2 14 Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Circuit held that negligence is the appropriate standard in a Section 14(a) action
against an investment banker.2 15 This approach apparently represents the
prevailing view. 216
A final argument relies on the "congressional reenactment theory" adopted
by the Supreme Court in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston217 and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran.218 Applying this theory, one
may argue that when Congress amended the securities laws on various
occasions since at least the 1970s, the lower federal courts had consistently and
routinely recognized an implied right of action under Section 14(a) based on
negligence against insiders and perhaps against other parties as well.219 As a
result, when Congress enacted major amendments to the securities laws but left
this interpretation of Section 14(a) intact, Congress is deemed to have intended
to preserve this judicial construction. 220 Such a construction comports with
215 Herskowitz v. Nutri/System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1988), cel. denied, 489
U.S. 1054, and cert. denied sub non. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Herskowitz, 489 U.S.
1060 (1989).
216 See cases cited supra note 170; see also Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 775
F.2d 917, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1985) Cm which the Eighth Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
assertion that strict liability should be the appropriate standard in § 14(a) actions.) On the
other hand, there is authority that "the objective sufficiency of the disclosure" is the
standard to be applied in § 14(a) actions for injunctive relief. See Ash v. LFE Corp., 525
F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 1975).
217 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (adopting cumulative construction of remedies under
securities laws).
218 456 U.S. 353 (1982). In ascertaining congressional intent, the Curran court
observed that it must assess the "contemporary legal context" at the time of the pertinent
statute's enactment. Elaborating, the Court reasoned:
[We must examine Congress' perception of the law that it was shaping or reshaping.
When Congress enacts new legislation, the question is whether Congress intended to
create a private remedy as a supplement to the express enforcement provisions of the
statute. When Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied private remedy
has already been recognized by the courts, however, the inquiry logically is different.
Congress need not have intended to create a new remedy, since one already existed; the
question is whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-existing remedy.
Id. at 378-79.2 19 See cases cited supra note 170.
2 20 Cf. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 384-86, in which the Court stated:
This cumulative construction of the remedies under the 1933 and 1934 Acts is also
supported by the fact that, when Congress comprehensively revised the securities laws
in 1975, a consistent line of judicial decisions had permitted plaintiffs to sue under §
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congressional intent, a principle that has endeared itself to members of the
Court.221
V. ISSUES OF CAUSATION
The Court in Mills left open the question of whether it was possible for
minority shareholders to satisfy the causation requirement when their votes
were not necessary to approve the transaction. 222 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.
addressed this issue, adverting to Borak and remembering the "broad remedial
purposes" of the securities acts.223 There, the court considered the defendant's
argument that the "minority stockholders' votes [were] meaningless since the
insiders . . . had enough votes to approve the transaction in any event." 224
Asserting that minority shareholder approval is not meaningless, but rather has
value "whether or not it is strictly essential to the power to act," 225 the court
answered the question left open in Mills in the affirmative.226
Rather than relying solely on Schlick's reasoning to satisfy the causation
requirement,227 the plaintiffs in Virginia Bankshares argued that the proxy
10(b) regardless of the availability of express remedies. In 1975 Congress enacted the
"most substantial and significant revision of this country's Federal securities laws since
the passage of the Securities Exchange Act in 1934." When Congress acted, federal
courts had consistently and routinely permitted a plaintiff to proceed under § 10(b) even
where express remedies under § 11 or other provisions were available. In light of this
well-established judicial interpretation, Congress' decision to leave § 10(b) intact
suggests that Congress ratified the cumulative nature of the § 10(b) action.
Id. (citations omitted).
221 See supra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
222 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 n.7 (1970).
223 Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
224 Id. at 382.
225 Id.; see also Swanson v. American Consumer Indus. Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331-
32 (7th Cir. 1969) ("The power to effect a given result certainly does not negative all
possibility of injury resulting from the fraudulent or manipulative use of that power.");
Mark V. Wilson, Comment, Reliance and Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws
When Minority Shareholders Are Forced Out, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 403 (1991)
(arguing for acceptance of Schlick approach to causation).
226 Schick, 507 F.2d at 383-84; see id. at 383 ("To hold otherwise would make the
proxy requirements a farce."). Sc/dick was not the only case to have answered affirmatively
the question left open in Mills. See, e.g., Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 563 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1977); Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
2 27 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2762 (1991).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
solicitation sufficed because neither VBI nor FABI would have continued with
the merger had the minority shareholders not given their approval, regardless
of whether such approval was necessary to the merger's fruition.228 Hence, the
plaintiffs asserted that, in order to promote favorable public perception, the
majority considered it imperative that the merger receive the approval of the
minority shareholders. Without such approval, the plaintiffs contended, the
majority would have abandoned the proposed transaction.229 The Court
rejected this contention, viewing it as raising mere speculation. In the Court's
view, the causal connection on this reasoning "would depend on a desire to
avoid bad shareholder or public relations, and the essential character of the
causal link would stem not from the enforceable terms of the parties' corporate
relationship, but from one party's apprehension of the ill will of the other." 230
The plaintiffs raised a second argument, namely, that minority votes were
necessary in order to save the merger from possible avoidance because of a
director's conflict of interest.23 1 The Court likewise found this argument to be
without merit because the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to avail themselves
of the Virginia "interested director" statute. In other words, "[a]ssuming that
the material facts about the merger and [the subject director's] interests were
not accurately disclosed, the minority votes were inadequate to ratify the
merger under state law, and [hence] there was no loss of state remedy. "232
Even though rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments relating to causation in the
case at hand, the Court nonetheless left a crucial issue unresolved: Whether the
requisite showing of causation may be made if, due to a materially false or
misleading statement or other deceptive conduct, the shareholder is lulled into
bypassing a state remedy that otherwise would have been available to protect
228 Id. In an accompanying footnote, the Court distinguished between "sue facts," a
"sue decision," and "shame facts" as follows:
A "sue fact" is, in general, a fact which is material to a sue decision. A "sue decision"
is a decision by a shareholder whether or not to institute a representative or derivative
suit alleging a state-law cause of action. "Shame facts" are said to be facts which, had
they been disclosed, would have "shamed" management into abandoning a proposed
transaction.
Id. at 2762 n.9 (citations omitted).
22 9 Id. at 2762.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 2762-63.
232 Id. at 2766 (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(A)(2) (Michie 1989)). Indeed,
the plaintiffs emerged victorious on their state law breach of fiduciary duty claim. See
Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII)
97,054 (4th Cir. 1992).
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him or her from financial loss.23 3 The subject of "lost state remedies" and their
impact on federal securities litigation were first alluded to by the Supreme
Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green.234 There, the Court held that
Section 10(b) will support liability only if "the conduct alleged can be fairly
viewed as 'manipulative or deceptive' within the meaning of the statute." 23 5
Because the conduct alleged in Santa Fe, breach of fiduciary duty, did not
satisfy this requirement, no federal remedy existed. However, the Court
implied that had the Santa Fe plaintiffs, because of the defendant's deceptive
conduct, lost a state remedy that would have protected them from financial
loss, such loss of remedy might have overcome their suit's deficiency. 23 6
Subsequent to Santa Fe, the federal appellate courts have uniformly adopted
this rationale.23 7 Both Goldberg v. Meridor23 8 and Healey v. Catalyst Recovery
of Pennsylvania23 9 exemplify this line of cases.
233 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765-66; cf. Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d
209, 219 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
234 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
235 Id. at 474.
236 The Court stated:
[Plaintiffs'] major contention ... is that the majority stockholder's failure to give the
minority advance notice of the merger was a material nondisclosure, even though the
Delaware short-form merger statute does not require such notice. But respondents do
not indicate how they might have acted differently had they had prior notice of the
merger. Indeed, they accept the conclusion of both courts below that under Delaware
law they could not have enjoined the merger because an appraisal proceeding is their
sole remedy in the Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness in the terms of the
merger. Thus, the failure to give advance notice was not a material nondisclosure
within the meaning of the statute or the Rule.
ld. at 474 n.14 (citations omitted).
237 See, e.g., Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980);
Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meilde, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor,
567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977);
Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 17, at 282-94.
238 Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 197), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069
(1978). But see Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 704 (7th Cir. 1987) (In
criticizing Goldberg and its progeny, the court was dissatisfied "with these holdings,
because they use the securities laws to redress substantive violations of state law.").
239 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Kidwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d
1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life
Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980); Wright v.
Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Benson v.
RMJ See. Corp., 683 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Gary R. Edson, Comment, Causation
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The Goldberg facts involved three entities: Universal Gas and Oil
Company, Inc. (IJGO), UGO's controlling parent, Maritimecor, S.A., and
Maritimecor's controlling parent, Maritime Fruit Carriers Company, Ltd.
David Goldberg, a minority shareholder of UGO, brought a derivative action
alleging that the parents had conspired to loot UGO, forcing it to transfer its
stock to Maritimecor while assuming Maritimecor's debt, and that this
transaction violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as well as breached common
law fiduciary duties. 240 As a part of their scheme, the defendants allegedly
caused misleading disclosures to be made to UGO's shareholders. Specifically,
two press releases, containing substantially the same language, painted an
inviting picture of post-transaction UGO:
As a result of the transaction, UGO will replace Maritimecor as the
principal operating subsidiary of [Maritime Fruit Carriers] and, as such, will
engage in a diversified line of shipping and shipping related activities including
the sale of ships and ship-building contracts, the operation of reefers and
tankers, and upon their delivery, product carriers and oil drilling rigs, and
underwriting marine insurance.2 41
The court, recognizing that injunctive relief had been available in New
York state court, characterized the defendants' press releases as having "lulled
the minority stockholders of UGO into security by a deceptive disclosure,"
thereby causing them to believe that an injunction was unnecessary to protect
their financial interests. 242 By analogy, the Goldberg plaintiffs stood in the
same shoes as the plaintiffs in Virginia Bankshares concerning the issue of
causation. The Goldberg defendants argued that, even if they had failed to
make adequate disclosure or had made a materially misleading disclosure, such
a defect would have had no effect because the UGO-Maritimecor transaction
was not subject to stockholder approval.2 43 In addressing this issue, the
in Rue 10b-5 Actions for Corporate Mismanagement, 48 U. CH. L. RLv. 936 (1981)
(arguing that in an action based on Goldberg, some showing that the state action would have
been successful is necessary to establish the causal connection between the violation and the
injury required for a 10b-5 violation). For a discussion of the tensions between Goldberg
and Santa Fe, see Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 17, at 282-300; C. Lamar Garren, Note,
Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's Resurrection of Rule lob-5 Liability for
Breaches of Corporate Fiduciary Duties to Minoity Shareholders, 64 VA. L. RLy. 765
(1978).
240 Goldberg, 567 F.2d at 211. At the district court's demand, the claims referring to
violations of state law were omitted from an amended complaint.
241 Id. at 214.
242 Id. at 220.
243 Id. at 218.
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Goldberg court focused principally on materiality rather than causation,
declaring that the TSC standard was satisfied.244 Subsequently, another Second
Circuit case addressed the causation requirement in this context, holding that
the plaintiff must show "by a firm preponderance of the evidence" that the suit
under state law would have succeeded.245
Rather than a parent corporation looting a subsidiary, the Healey case
involved a merger between Catalyst Regeneration Services, Inc. (Catalyst), and
Catalyst Recovery of Pennsylvania, Inc. (CRPa). Another corporation, SCR,
had acquired 80% of Catalyst and had formed CRPa in order to merge it with
Catalyst. Healey, the plaintiff, owned the remaining 20% of Catalyst, and
although he had negotiated for the sale of his Catalyst interest to SCR while
SCR negotiated and purchased its 80% of Catalyst, the sale never occurred.
Throughout the course of his negotiations with SCR, Healey had requested on
numerous occasions that SCR supply him with specified information, but SCR
never complied.246
Once the merger became effective, Healey filed a direct action, alleging a
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. He argued that, if he had been given
the information he requested, he would have sought to enjoin the merger in
state court.2 47 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
although recognizing that the plaintiff's argument steered dangerously close to
the precipice that Santa Fe had established, distinguished the Supreme Court's
holding thus: "The crucial difference is whether there was misrepresentation or
omission in the flow of information between the majority and minority
shareholders." 248 Although there had been no misinformation connected with
244 Id. at 218-19. But see id. at 225 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the
majority has neatly undone [Supreme Court] holdings by creating a federal cause of action
for a breach of fiduciary duty that will apply in all cases, save for those rare instances where
the fiduciary denounces himself in advance").
245 See Madison Consultants v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1983).
246 Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 645 (3d cir. 1980).
2 47 Id. at 647.
2 48 Id. at 646. The Court further opined that "iblecause this result flows from
misinformation that harms the plaintiff, it is precisely the type of situation to which rule
lOb-5 is addressed." Id. But see Judge Aldisert's probing dissent, in which he takes the
majority to task for hanging its hat on Santa Fe's footnote fourteen. He argues that the
majority's emphasis on language virtually in the margins of Santa Fe establishes a different
standard of materiality for situations in which state remedies are available than in those in
which they are not:
Under the majority's formulation, only if a plaintiff has a state claim for an injunction
can he recover under federal rule 10b-5 for breach of fiduciary duty. If state injunctive
relief is unavailable, as in Santa Fe, the plaintiff also has no federal remedy. Thus,
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the merger in Santa Fe, there had been such on the Healey facts. Therefore, the
Third Circuit held "that where a misrepresentation or omission of material
information deprives a proper plaintiff minority shareholder of an opportunity
under state law to enjoin a merger, there is a cause of action under rule lOb-
5."249 To satisfy this causation requirement, the Healey court held that the
plaintiff must establish "a reasonable probability of ultimate success" in the
state court action. 25 0
Arguing on the basis of a lost state remedy theory, the Virginia Bankshares
plaintiffs attempted to persuade the Court that the fraudulent proxy solicitation
elicited enough minority votes under Virginia law to make the merger's
culmination immune from attack based on the subject director's conflict of
interest. 25 1 Under this theory, the plaintiffs may not have lost, per se, their
state remedy because of shareholder reliance on the misleading solicitation
material. Instead, the Court noted that the plaintiffs' theory sought to establish
a link that is "a step in the process of barring a class of shareholders from
resort to a state remedy otherwise available." 25 2 It appears, therefore, that
Sandberg's argument presented an attenuated version of the GoldberglHealey
mix of facts, but nevertheless sought the same rationale and holding from the
Court.
The Court ultimately avoided the issue, concluding that "there is no
indication in the law or facts before us that the proxy solicitation resulted in
any . . . loss [of a state remedy]." 25 3 Significantly, declining to dismiss
plaintiffs' arguments as untenable, the Court instead delineated various theories
under which the causation requirement might be satisfied. These theories,
rather than aiding plaintiffs under federal law who have no state remedy, the majority's
formulation provides federal relief to plaintiffs who have state remedies, but denies
federal relief to plaintiffs who have no state remedy!
Id. at 658 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).2 49 Id. at 647.
25 0 Id.; cf. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins.
Co., 606 F.2d 602, 614 (1979), (the Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff to establish "a
reasonable basis for state relief").
251 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2765-66 (1991); see
discussion supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
252 Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2765.
253 Id. at 2766. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-691(A)(2) (Michie 1989) does not invalidate a
transaction solely because of a director's conflict of interest if, inter alia, the minority
holders ratify the transaction after disclosure of the fact of the transaction and conflict. The
Court assumed that these material facts had not been accurately disclosed, thus rendering
the minority votes inadequate to ratify the merger under Virginia law and thereby obviating
the loss of a state remedy. Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766.
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however, were of no avail to the plaintiffs because they neither had a right to
appraisal nor could they meritoriously argue that they had been lulled into
foregoing an otherwise available state remedy, such as the procurement of an
injunction. 25 4
Since Virginia Bankshares, a relatively small number of courts have
examined the lost state remedy theory in this context. For example, the Second
Circuit held for the plaintiffs, reasoning that the defendants' deficient proxy
materials may have induced such plaintiffs to forfeit their appraisal rights.25 5
Another case granted the defendants' motion to dismiss because of a curious
Ninth Circuit perspective on this issue. In Barth v. NovaSensor,25 6 the plaintiff
complained that, if adequate disclosure had been made, he would have sought
to invoke state law remedies. 25 7 Based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
idwell ex rel. Penfold v. Meikle,25 8 the district court held that "[ifn order to
sustain the action under the causation element of Rule 10b-5... the plaintiff
must be able to succeed in obtaining either permanent injunctive relief or
damages in excess of the appraisal value in the state law action." 25 9
This is a troubling holding in at least four respects. The most obvious
reason is that fair value awarded in an appraisal proceeding may exceed the
price offered by the majority.2 60 Permitting the majority to squeeze out
254 See Virginia Bankshares, 111 S. Ct. at 2766 n.14. Under Virginia law, appraisal
ordinarily is the shareholder's exclusive remedy in the merger context. See Adams v.
United States Distrib. Corp., 34 S.E.2d 244 (Va. 1945). However, dissenting shareholders
in bank mergers do not even have a right to appraisal. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-43
(Michie 1989). Nonetheless, the plaintiffs in Virginia Bankshares ultimately were successful
on their breach of fiduciary duty claim. See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., [1992
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,054 (4th Cir. 1992).
255 See Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 979 F.2d 924 (2d Cir. 1992); see also
Scattergood v. Perelman, 945 F.2d 618, 626 n.4 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that causation
possibly may be shown when "the majority's misstatement or omission has caused the
minority shareholders to forego an opportunity under state law to enjoin a merger").
256 Barth v. NovaSensor, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,494 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
257 Id. at 92,177.
258 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979).
259 Barth v. NovaSensor, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,494, at 92,177; see also Roosevelt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 958 F.2d 416
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (dicta interpreting Virginia Bankshares broadly).
260 See In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992) (affirming
appraisal award of $71.20 per share when shareholders received $58 per share in the
merger transaction). See generally Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy
and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985) ("when state law makes the
[appraisal] remedy available a shareholder is able to translate dissent into action by filing a
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minority shareholders at an inferior price through deceptive conduct, thereby
inducing the minority to forego their appraisal rights, is antithetical to
disclosure mandates of the federal securities laws as well as principles of
corporate governance. 261 Second, the Ninth Circuit limited the scope of
Kidwell in United States v. Margala.262 The court in Margala addressed the
issue of materiality and noted that a fact is material if a reasonable investor
"could respond to the fact's disclosure by protecting himself from possible
financial loss." 26 3 Such course of action may include the subject shareholder,
upon receiving sufficient disclosure, perfecting his or her right to appraisal or
bringing suit in state court to enjoin the contemplated merger.264 Third, since
the time that Kdwell was decided, a number of courts have opined that fair
price in an appraisal proceeding and damages in an action for breach of
fiduciary duty frequently are identical. 265 Thus, requiring that damages be
shown in excess of appraisal value simply does not make sense in light of this
rationale. Fourth, as discussed below, California and several other states hold
timely objection and demand for payment and, if no settlement with the corporation can be
reached, beginning appraisal proceedings in court"). On the subject of the appraisal
remedy, Professor Eisenberg has stated:
Mhe appraisal right presents many difficulties from the shareholder's perspective: it is
always technical; it may be expensive; it is uncertain in result; in the case of a publicly
held corporation, is unlikely to produce a better result than could have been obtained on
the market; and the ultimate award is taxable. It is, in short, a remedy of desperation.
Generally speaking, no shareholder in a publicly held corporation will invoke the
appraisal right unless he feels that the structural change from which he dissents is
shockingly improvident and that the fair value of his shares before the change will far
exceed the value of his shares thereafter.
MELVIN A. EiSENBERG, THE STRUCruRE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSTS 83
(1976).
261 In this regard, note that shareholders were given a right to appraisal in merger
transactions as a substitute for their previous right that such transactions could take place
only upon receiving unanimous consent. See William 1. Carney, Fundwenta Corporate
Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Buines Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69,
77-94.
262 662 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1982).
263 Id.
2 64 See cases cited infra notes 265, 275, 284.
265 See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). A key exception is
that in suits for breach of fiduciary duty, the trial court may allow the granting of rescissory
damages. Id. at 714. Generally, an award of rescissory damages values the stock at the time
of resale or at the time ofjudgment rather than at the time of the transaction. See generally
STEINBERG, supra note 1, at § 15.01 et seq.
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aggrieved shareholders almost exclusively to an appraisal remedy.266 In such a
situation, injunctive relief may be so rarely ordered that on a practical level it is
nonexistent.
Because the Virginia Bankshares Court did not reach this loss of state
remedies theory, the ultimate legitimacy of Goldberg, Healey and their line, of
which both Barth and Imdwel are members, remains undecided. But the issue
of whether the loss of a state remedy should support liability is evident. The
ways in which this issue might arise are varied: whether, due to a disclosure
deficiency, a minority shareholder loses an opportunity to enjoin a merger, or
fails to perfect appraisal rights, or an acquiring corporation makes the merger
contingent on procuring the approval of a majority of the minority shares. 267 In
each of these situations, the policy reasons underpinning Blue Chzip Stamps and
prompting the Court's decision in Virginia Bankshares do not apply.
Consistent with this analysis, the appraisal right has evolved as a solution
for shareholders in a merger context who believe that the price offered for their
shares inadequately compensates them for their investment. At common law, it
was necessary for all shareholders of a corporation to consent to fundamental,
organic changes in corporate structure.268 Theoretically, the appraisal remedy
prevents tyranny of either the majority or minority because fundamental
changes may occur without consent of all shareholders while helping to ensure
that those who elect to dissent receive fair value for their investment.269 For
instance, corporation statutes, such as the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, provide that shareholders who
perfect their appraisal rights will receive fair value for their stock.270 As such,
this remedy, although subject to criticism,271 provides the stockholder with a
measure of meaningful protection.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has suggested
the importance that such rights have in the context of federal securities law.
266 See sources cited infra note 275.
267 This situation might arise when majority shareholders seek to satisfy the "entire
fairness" test set forth in Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711-15.
268 See Carney, supra note 261, at 77-94; Kanda & Levmore, supra note 260, at 434.
269 In practice, however, the appraisal remedy, as viewed by its critics, is "a remedy
of desperation." Eisenberg, supra note 260, at 83; see Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's
Appraisal Remedy: An Ersay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE LJ. 222, 233 (1962) (stating that
"the only things certain [in the appraisal process] are the uncertainty, the delay, and the
expense").
270 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Michie 1991); Revised Model Bus. Corp.
Act §§ 13.02, 13.20-13.28 (1984).
271 See sources cited supra notes 260-61,269.
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The plaintiffs in Swanson v. American Conswners Industries, Inc. ,272 like those
in Virginia Bankshares, argued that, although their numbers were insufficient
to overcome a merger's approval even if they had not been misled, they should
nevertheless be able to satisfy the causation requirement. 273 Declining to
resolve this issue, the court recognized a second theory of causation that had
been raised, premised on the assertion that the plaintiffs had been deprived of
their appraisal rights: "[It is inescapable that plaintiff shareholders have proven
all the elements required to impress liability on defendants under Section 10(b)
. . . and the Commission's Rule lOb-5 for loss of their informed ability to
exercise their statutory appraisal rights." 274
The importance of the appraisal remedy under state law should not be
underestimated. In some states, the appraisal remedy has been held to be
exclusive, regardless of whether the majority shareholders have breached their
fiduciary duties. 275 The Supreme Court of California in Steinberg v. Amplica,
Inc.,276 for example, dealt with a situation in which there was adequate
disclosure and the plaintiff knew of his right to appraisal before the merger. On
such facts, the court held the following:
[A]t least in a case such as this, where the plaintiff was aware of all the
facts leading to his cause of action for alleged misconduct in connection with
the term of the merger prior to the time the merger was consummated but
deliberately opted to sue for damages instead of seeking appraisal, [the
appraisal statute] acts as a bar.2 77
The court implied, however, that had the plaintiffs been unaware of the
fraudulent acts until after the merger, appraisal may not have been the
exclusive remedy. 278
The Supreme Court of Delaware's seminal decision on this subject is
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.279 The plaintiffs in Weinberger complained that
Signal, the parent corporation, forced UOP, the acquired entity, into a hasty
272 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973).
273 Id. at 518.
274 Id. at 521.
275 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683 (Cal. 1986); Yanow v. Teal
Indus., Inc., 422 A.2d 311 (Conn. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.601 (West 1985).
276 729 P.2d 683 (Cal. 1986).
277 Id. at 691.
278 See id. at 689: "[We are not concerned with a claim that defendants acted
fraudulently by concealing or misrepresenting the terms of the merger. Nor does plaintiff
contend that he was unaware of his right to appraisal as a result of defendants' alleged
misconduct."
279 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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approval of Signal's offer for the remainder of UOP stock and that certain
directors, who occupied seats on both UOP's and Signal's boards, failed to
share a Signal internal study generated through the use of UOP data revealing
that UOP would be a good investment for Signal at any price up to $24 per
share.280 Signal eventually offered $21 per share without ever disclosing the
existence of the feasibility study. The court held that the defendants' conduct
did not satisfy the entire fairness test and, hence, constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty.281
Although the minority shareholders in Weinberger were not limited to
appraisal rights because of this breach, the case stands in part for the
proposition that "Delaware courts [have returned] to the rule that minority
shareholders [normally] are limited to the monetary fair value of their
stock." 282 Such a remedy is exclusive absent a showing of fraud,
misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross
and palpable overreaching. 283 In view that this appraisal valuation may exceed
the price offered by the majority and is to be measured generally on the same
basis as a breach of fiduciary duty action,284 would-be federal plaintiffs should
therefore have a cause of action based on their having lost their right to
appraisal.
A related basis for a claim under the federal securities laws involves a
situation in which a corporation makes a merger's fruition contingent on the
approval of a majority of the minority shares. This condition may be
2 80 Id. at 708-09.
281 The Delaware Supreme Court envisioned the issue thus:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price. The
former embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated,
structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors
and the stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to the economic
and financial considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant factors:
assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements that affect the
intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.
Id. at 711 (citations omitted).
282 Marc L Steinberg & Evalyn N. Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62
WAsH. U. L.Q. 351,365 (1984).
283 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714; see also Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio
1990).2 84 See Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473 N.E.2d 19 (N.Y. 1984); STEINBERG,
supra note 1.
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undertaken to help satisfy the entire fairness test under Weinberger.28 5 The
Virginia Bankshares plaintiffs argued a similar point, that defendants would
have been unwilling to proceed with the merger without the minority
shareholders' approval, or, in other words, that the majority would not have
allowed the merger to consummate without receiving the approval of a majority
of the minority shares. 286 The Court recognized that this rationale was based
on defendants' alleged "desire to avoid bad shareholder or public relations,
and.., from one party's apprehension of the ill will of the other." 28 7 The
Court's conclusion that such a desire or apprehension, if it existed, was driven
by neither the requirements of law nor by corporate by-law foreclosed the
argument, thereby precluding the causation requirement from being
satisfied. 288
The same concerns do not arise when an organic change like a merger is
predicated on a majority of the minority's approval. If the controlling
shareholders seeking to effect a merger require such approval pursuant to
corporate resolution or binding contract, in order to help satisfy either the fair
price or fair dealing aspect of the entire fairness test, the requirement would not
stem from a desire to avoid ill will as in Virginia Bankshares. Rather, such a
voting structure would arise from the majority's desire to accomplish the
merger without being subject to strenuous legal challenge under applicable state
law. It also may serve as a strategically useful mechanism to relegate minority
shareholders solely to their appraisal rights.289
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the implications of Virginia Bankshares are yet to be fully
realized, the case, from the day it was decided, established static lines of
285 See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 707-08. If such a vote is undertaken with full and
fair disclosure, the burden of proof shifts to the minority to prove that the merger is unfair.
See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) ("[Ajpproval of a merger,
as here, by an informed vote of a majority of the minority shareholders, while not a legal
prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness of the merger entirely to the
plaintiffs.").
286 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S. Ct. 2749, 2762 (1991).287 ld.
288 Id. at 2755.
289 See Robert K. Payson & Gregory A. Inskip, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.: Its
Practical Significance in the Planning and Defense of Cash-Out Mergers, 8 DEL. . CORP.
L. 83, 90 (1983) ("As a practical matter, the parent's burden of showing the fairness of the
transaction will decrease in direct proportion to the number of safeguards employed in
structuring the transaction."). But see Dominick v. Marcove, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,329 (D. Colo. 1992).
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demarcation for certain areas of federal jurisprudence. While the Supreme
Court affixed its imprimatur on the true purpose cases, it also postured a
restrictive stance toward the implication of private rights of action under the
federal securities laws specifically and under the totality of federal laws in
general.
Equally persistent is the sometimes circuitous trek of disputes winding their
way into federal district court and upwards, toward the High Nine. For
instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently
revisited its 1991 Howing decision 290 in order to reconsider it in light of
Virginia Bankshares.291 Although the Supreme Court declined to resolve the
propriety of the Goldberg/Healey line of cases, the Sixth Circuit held that the
loss of a state law remedy supports causation under the Mills analysis.292 In
Howing, the court recognized that minority shareholders whose votes were
insufficient to affect the outcome of a freeze-out merger could establish
causation by showing the loss of their appraisal rights.293 Interestingly, the
court conducted its analysis not in the Section 14(a) or 10(b) context, but rather
in an action implied under Section 13(e) of the Exchange Act. 294 Hence, even
the restrictive construction of implied rights set forth in Virginia Bankshares
did not counsel against the continued recognition of a Section 13(e) right of
action which the Sixth Circuit had implied in an earlier episode of the Howing
saga.295 Thus the joints of Virginia Bankshares and its progeny continue to
move, weaving the fabric of securities law, implied rights of action and
corporate governance.
2 90 Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991); see Howing Co.
v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987).
291 Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 112 S. Ct. 39 (1991) (remanded in light of
Virginia Bankshares).292 Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992).
293 Id. at 705-10.
294 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1990) (setting forth antifraud provision and SEC rulemaking
authority in connection with going private transactions).
295 Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987); see supra notes
155-60 and accompanying text.

